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Bargaining is ubiquitous in our professional and private lives. Not surprisingly, bargaining has 
received considerable research attention. Because real-world settings generally entail a lack of 
control, most empirical insights derive from laboratory experiments. The external validity of 
laboratory findings is, however, still an open question (Levitt and List, 2007; Camerer, 2011; 
Baltussen, van den Assem and van Dolder, 2014). Two of the grounds for concern are the frequent 
use of student subjects and the small or hypothetical stakes. In the present study, we use data from 
the British TV show Divided. This game show combines high stakes and a diverse subject pool within 
a controlled setting. 
We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those 
who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, and 
take home larger amounts. Threatening to play hardball is ineffective: although contestants who 
announce that they will not back down do well relative to others, they do not secure larger absolute 
amounts and they harm others. There is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little evidence 
that demographic characteristics matter. 
I.  Game Show and Data 
Divided was developed by the Dutch media firm Talpa, and produced for the ITV network in the 
United Kingdom by Endemol UK. The show debuted on TV in May 2009 and ran until May 2010. A 
total of 53 episodes were aired. 
Each game is played with three contestants who are strangers to each other. There are two stages: 
one in which the contestants team up to accumulate a communal jackpot through answering quiz 
questions, and one in which they have to divide this jackpot between them. 
The first stage lasts for a maximum of five rounds. Round 1 has five questions that are worth up to 
£3,000 each. In the subsequent four rounds the number of questions and the maximum value per 
question are 4, 3, 2 and 1, and £7,500, £15,000, £30,000 and £75,000, respectively. How much a 
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question actually contributes to the jackpot depends on the team’s speed of answering. Incorrect 
answers halve the jackpot and after three mistakes the team is out of the game. At the end of each 
round, the team can decide to stop and divide the jackpot, but only if they make that decision 
unanimously. The online appendix includes a schematic overview of this first stage. 
The second stage comprises the bargaining element that is central to our analysis. The jackpot is split 
into three unequal shares. The largest is marked A, the middle B, and the smallest C. The players 
unanimously have to decide who gets which. First, they each receive 15 seconds to make their case 
and stake their claim to one of the shares. The order in which they are asked to do so is determined 
by their positions on the stage, starting from the viewers’ left. If they do not agree immediately, they 
have 100 seconds to reach consensus in a free-form discussion. With each second that passes they 
lose one percentage point of the initial jackpot, and after 100 seconds there is nothing left. After 50 
seconds there is a time-out. In this brief pause, the contestants keep silent and the game show host 
summarizes the situation by emphasizing how much has been lost and what is left, or by 
enumerating the remaining values of the three shares. The second stage can thus be seen as a 
natural bargaining experiment where “subjects” have to unanimously decide on the allocation of 
indivisible shares, in a format that allows face-to-face communication and incorporates (close to) 
continuous costs to bargaining. 
For each episode we collected data on the relevant observables, including demographic 
characteristics of the contestants, the results for each quiz question and the individual contributions 
to the answers, contestants’ claims and how these changed during the bargaining phase, whether 
and when agreement was reached, and the individual payoffs. Combined, the 53 episodes comprise 
the games of 56 teams, with some starting in one episode and continuing in the next. Because 13 
teams leave the show early after three incorrect answers, 43 are used in our analyses. 
Men and women each represent half of the contestant pool. The average contestant is 36 years of 
age, the youngest 18 and the oldest 70. The average final jackpot is £33,512, the smallest £7,282 and 
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the largest £115,755. These are considerable sums relative to the amounts typically used in 
laboratory experiments and also many times the median gross weekly earnings of £404 in the UK in 
April 2010 (Statistical Bulletin Office for National Statistics, 8 December 2010). 
Two-thirds of the time the three shares in the jackpot represent close to 60, 30, and 10 percent. Only 
two other subdivisions occur: 70/20/10 and 65/25/10, both in 16 percent of the cases. Most 
contestants initially claim the largest share: 79 percent opt for A, 16 percent pick B and 5 percent 
content themselves with C straight away. Only 9 percent of the teams agree immediately, 72 percent 
do so while the timer counts down, and 19 percent fail to reach agreement and go home empty-
handed. The efficiency rate, or the average fraction of the jackpot that is actually awarded, is 
approximately 50 percent. The average outcome per contestant is £5,633. Would we have run this 
show as an experiment ourselves, the total costs in subject payoffs alone would have been £726,706. 
The online appendix displays the distribution of the bargaining duration and provides more detailed 
descriptive statistics. 
II.  Analyses and Findings 
Table 1 summarizes our regression analyses. Model 1 is an ordered probit model that explains a 
contestant’s decision to initially claim share A (3), B (2), or C (1). Model 2 is a probit model for the 
likelihood that a contestant makes a hardball announcement at the start of the bargaining stage by 
stating not to back down from her initial claim. This model is estimated for the subset of contestants 
who initially claimed share A (only one contestant who claimed share B made a hardball 
announcement). When there is no immediate agreement, some will have to make concessions to 
bring agreement within reach. Model 3 is a probit model for the likelihood that a contestant lowers 
her claim. This model is estimated for those who initially claimed share A or B in situations with no 
immediate agreement. 
A contestant’s bargaining outcome can be defined relative to others and relative to the initial size of 
the jackpot. Model 4 considers the payoffs relative to others. This ordered probit model explains the 
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share A (3), B (2), or C (1) that a contestant ends up with. Contestants who fail to reach agreement 
and go home empty-handed are excluded. By solely looking at the share a contestant receives, this 
model ignores the efficiency of the bargaining process. Model 5 therefore analyzes the money that 
players take home as a fraction of the initial jackpot. Additional results are in the online appendix. 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ] 
A. Demographic Characteristics 
Psychologists have devoted considerable attention to individual differences in negotiation, especially 
during the 1970s and the early 1980s. The general picture regarding demographic and personality 
characteristics is one of contradictory findings, frequent null results, and low explanatory power 
(Rubin and Brown, 1975; Thompson, 1990). For gender, meta-analyses indicate that males are more 
competitive and better in acquiring favorable outcomes, but the differences are slim and sensitive to 
the experimental conditions (Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer, 1998; Stuhlmacher and Walters, 
1999). 
The demographic variables that we study are gender, age and education. Contestants normally 
mention their age when they introduce themselves, but not their education. We have therefore 
estimated their education on the basis of occupation and other information they provide. We 
distinguish between contestants with and without a bachelor (or higher) degree. Those who are 
currently enrolled in higher education and those whose job title suggests work experience equivalent 
to the bachelor level or higher are also included in the higher education category. 
In line with the general picture from earlier studies, we find little evidence that behavior and 
outcomes are related to demographic characteristics. Gender, age and education are insignificant 
determinants of contestants’ initial claims, their hardball announcements and concessions, and the 
shares they end up with. The sole significant result is that younger contestants secure a larger part of 
the initial size of the pie. 
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B. Contributions 
Entitlements are subjectively-held fairness judgments that people perceive as rights they wish to 
defend, and can arise from history, custom, the status quo, or contributions (Schlicht, 1998). Gächter 
and Riedl (2005) experimentally show that entitlements influence bargaining behavior and outcomes. 
In Divided, the only and apparent source of entitlements are contestants’ individual contributions to 
the communal jackpot. Theoretical and empirical work on equity theory suggests that contestants 
will care about the proportionality of outcomes and inputs, and deem it fair if those who contributed 
more to the jackpot receive a larger share (Adams, 1965; Konow, 2003). 
To quantify contributions, we estimate both the positive and negative contributions made by each 
player. Specifically, if the group gave a correct answer, we divide the credit for the answer equally 
over all contestants who argued in favor of it; those who did not argue for any particular answer, 
argued for a wrong one, or argued for multiple answers (including or not including the correct one) 
receive no share of the credit.1 If the group gave an incorrect answer, the credit is divided equally 
over those who argued in favor of one of the incorrect answers; those who did not argue for any 
particular answer or argued for the correct one only are not assigned any credit. 
We compute both a composite measure that combines the credits for correct and incorrect answers 
into one metric, and measures that disaggregate the contributions to correct and incorrect answers. 
The former is calculated by adding up the contestant’s credits for correct answers and subtracting 
her credits for incorrect answers. We standardize by dividing by the total number of correct answers 
minus the total number of incorrect answers of the team. The measure for correct (incorrect) 
                                                 
1
 There are three exceptions to this rule: (i) if all contestants argued both for and against the correct answer 
but managed to come to the correct answer together, they are each assigned one-third of the credit; (ii) if two 
contestants argued both for and against the correct answer and came to the correct answer together while the 
third remained silent, then these two share the credit; (iii) if contestants made a random guess and this guess 
turned out to be correct, then they share the credit. 
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answers is calculated by adding up all credits of the contestant for questions answered correctly 
(incorrectly), and standardizing by the total number of correct (incorrect) answers. 
We find that equity concerns play an important role in the bargaining process. Contestants who 
contributed more to the communal jackpot claim a larger share and end up with a larger prize. (The 
results for the composite measure are in the online appendix.) There are different effects for positive 
and negative contributions: positive contributions drive contestants’ opening claims, while negative 
contributions determine whether a contestant makes concessions during the bargaining process. 
Consequently, both positive and negative contributions determine the final outcomes. 
One explanation for this asymmetry is that those with negative contributions initially consider such 
contributions to be innocent mistakes for which they should not be held accountable, but 
subsequent communication promotes a more objective, less self-serving view (Loewenstein et al., 
1993). The asymmetric effect is also in line with query theory (Johnson, Häubl and Keinan, 2007): 
contestants’ initial focus on positive contributions occurs when the problem is framed in positive 
terms (“what share do you deserve?”), but switches to negative contributions when the framing 
becomes negative (“who should move their claim downward?”). 
C. Situational Variables 
The situational factors we consider are the order in which contestants make their initial claims, the 
stakes, and the differences between the percentage shares to be divided. To investigate whether 
there is a first-mover effect we include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
contestant was the first to make her claim to one of the shares. For the role of stakes we use dummy 
variables representing the different quartiles of the stake distribution. We use the variance across 
the percentage shares as a measure for the divergence between the prizes.  
There seems to be no first-mover advantage. Those who get to make their claim early do not behave 
differently and do not earn more. When the stakes are relatively low, contestants are less likely to 
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announce a hardball strategy. The effect of the stakes on concessions is U-shaped: concessions occur 
relatively often with low and high stakes, and less so in between. Correspondingly, contestants retain 
a larger share of the jackpot if the jackpot is at the low or high end of its range. Last, a greater 
variance of the percentage shares leads to more hardball announcements and less efficient 
bargaining. 
D. Hardball 
A considerable line of research focuses on commitment strategies in bargaining (e.g., Schelling, 1956; 
Crawford, 1982). In our bargaining setting, contestants cannot formally commit themselves in the 
sense that they are always free to adjust their claim without incurring monetary costs. However, 
contestants may attempt to convince others that they feel internally committed to a specific share by 
making hardball announcements. 
Announcing a hardball strategy of not backing down turns out to not be beneficial (the regression 
results are in the online appendix). Contestants who used this threat improve their relative standing 
within the group, but they do not manage to obtain larger amounts in an absolute sense because 
they make it more difficult to reach an agreement. Their opponents are worse off, because 
contestants who make a hardball announcement also walk the walk: they are less likely to make a 
concession and thus frustrate the bargaining process. 
III.  Concluding Remarks 
We have examined high stakes bargaining in the TV show Divided. One of the main findings is that 
entitlements derived from contributions are an important driving force behind behavior and 
outcomes. This refutes the commonly held belief that fairness concerns will be unimportant when 
monetary incentives are sufficiently large (Rabin, 1993; Telser, 1995; Levitt and List, 2007). Another 
interesting result is the inefficacy of adopting a hardball strategy. Due to bargaining costs, the total 
pie in our game shrinks such that there is no advantage left for the threatening party and others are 
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worse off. This result is in line with game-theoretic reasoning, as simple strategies that anyone can 
follow should not increase earnings. 
One general comment on the game is that the key to maximizing the overall payoff to the team 
appears to depend on the willingness of one of the players to agree to accept the smallest prize. 
When no one is willing to concede that he or she contributed the least, deadlocks are common. We 
conjecture that if an objective taly of relative contributions had been made available to the players 
they would have found it easier to reach agreements. 
Possible selection effects can be a reason for external validity concerns. Contestants self-select into 
auditions, and are then selected by producers to play the game for real. It is unclear to what degree 
such processes may have influenced our findings. Selection procedures are of course not unique to 
game shows, and form an intrinsic part of almost any field or laboratory setting. Yet, our sample 
varies widely in terms of background characteristics, seemingly forming a cross-section of middle-
class society that is much closer to a cross-section of the general population than the university 
students commonly employed in experimental work. 
The game show setting can be another reason for concerns. While there is no live studio audience, 
contestants know that many people will observe their behavior on TV. This makes that the bargaining 
game is not strictly one-shot, as contestants’ behavior and outcomes might affect their reputation. 
The specific setting might be viewed as providing an incentive to fight harder, as one may not want 
to appear weak on TV. However, being viewed as stubborn and responsible for losing a large fraction 
of the jackpot is also an outcome to be avoided. Furthermore, the game show setting might trigger a 
desire to “win the contest” and go home with more money than fellow team members. Alternatively, 
contestants may believe that the game is won if they manage to come to resolution with the people 
they teamed up with. Thus, although the game show setting might influence the behavior of the 
contestants, there is no a priori reason to believe that the environment encourages any particular 
type of behavior. 
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For these reasons, we do not consider these possible influences of the specific decision environment 
to render our findings less interesting or less predictive of behavior than other research settings. In 
laboratory and field situations there is always some degree of scrutiny, and each setting will cause 
particular motives to be more prominent than others. It is infeasible to study behavior under each 
and every possible set of conditions. The optimal approach is therefore to focus on a limited number 
of diverging settings. The contribution of the present paper should be evaluated in this light. We 
have employed the unique features of a TV game show to study bargaining behavior outside the 
laboratory and for stakes that are impossible to replicate in experiments. 
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Table 1 – Regression Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Initial  
claim 
Hardball 
announcement 
Concession Share  
won 
Prize won / 
Initial jackpot 
  Age -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.003** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.001) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.230 -0.123 -0.096 0.066 -0.017 
 (0.290) (0.314) (0.263) (0.205) (0.028) 
  Education (high=1) -0.008 0.033 -0.057 -0.003 -0.017 
 (0.333) (0.329) (0.303) (0.212) (0.035) 
  First mover (first=1) 0.007 -0.121 0.300 -0.181 -0.009 
 (0.288) (0.279) (0.327) (0.337) (0.035) 
  Stakes 2
nd
 quartile 0.288 0.934** -0.532** 
 
-0.089* 
 (0.438) (0.464) (0.248) 
 
(0.045) 
  Stakes 3
rd
 quartile 0.090 0.746 -0.545** 
 
-0.083* 
 (0.355) (0.461) (0.231) 
 
(0.043) 
  Stakes 4
th
 quartile -0.208 1.009** -0.156 
 
0.019 
 (0.355) (0.438) (0.239) 
 
(0.045) 
  Variance shares 11.742 31.002** -9.183 
 
-4.002** 
 (12.180) (14.469) (10.580) 
 
(1.500) 
  Contribution correct 4.133*** -0.533 0.085 2.969** 0.437*** 
 (1.436) (1.841) (1.722) (1.424) (0.153) 
  Contribution incorrect -0.660 -0.005 1.801** -1.260** -0.114* 
 
(0.522) (0.671) (0.854) (0.640) (0.066) 
Constant 
 
-2.293** 0.330 
 
0.397*** 
 
 
(1.167) (0.942) 
 
(0.097) 
α1 -0.680 
  
-0.285 
  (0.953) 
  
(0.616) 
 α2 0.288 
  
0.642 
  (0.950) 
  
(0.618) 
 Log-likelihood -73.71 -53.79 -74.24 -109.52 
 R
2 
0.084 0.103 0.069 0.051 0.186 
Observations  129  102  115  105  129 
Clusters  43  43  39  35  43 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the team level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level 
    * Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Game ends after 3 mistakes 
 ROUND 2: 4 questions, 
each worth max. £7,500 
  
     
  
STOP or PLAY  Dividing stage 
     
Game ends after 3 mistakes 
 ROUND 3: 3 questions, 
each worth max. £15,000 
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each worth max. £30,000 
  
     
  
STOP or PLAY  Dividing stage 
     
Game ends after 3 mistakes 
 ROUND 5: 1 question, 
worth max. £75,000 
  
     
  
Dividing stage   
 
 
Figure A1: Flow Chart of the First Stage of the Game. Three contestants first play a 
maximum of five rounds of quiz questions in which they team up to accumulate a jackpot. 
Correct answers increase the jackpot, while incorrect answers halve it. A third mistake ends the 
game, and all contestants then leave empty-handed. At the end of each of the first four rounds, 
the team can voluntarily decide to proceed to the second stage. In this final part of the game 
they have to divide the accumulated money between them. 
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Figure A2: Bargaining Duration. The histogram shows the distribution of bargaining duration 
for the 43 teams in our sample, where the time frame is divided into ten-second intervals. The 
leftmost (rightmost) bar corresponds to the teams that reach immediate agreement (fail to reach 
agreement). The number of teams not yet in agreement immediately prior to a given duration 
category is displayed at the bottom of the bar. 
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Table A1: Selected Game Show Characteristics 
The table shows selected characteristics for the British TV game show Divided, extracted from our sample of 53 
episodes. Answer in Round r (r = 1, 2, … ,5) is the status of the team’s answer to a question in Round r, with a 
value of 1 (0) for a correct (incorrect) answer. Jackpot change Round r (r = 1, 2, … ,5) records the difference 
between the size of jackpot at the end and at the start of Round r for all teams still in play at the end of the 
round. Quiz rounds measures the number of quiz rounds completed before elimination or entering the 
bargaining stage. Mistakes is the accumulated number of incorrect answers when the team enters the 
bargaining stage. Jackpot describes the size of the jackpot. Prize A (Prize B, Prize C) / jackpot expresses the size 
of the largest (middle, smallest) share as a fraction of the jackpot. Initial claim indicates the share that the 
contestant claims before the timer starts counting down, with a value of 3 (2, 1) for A (B, C). Final claim is the 
share that the contestant claims at the end of the bargaining process, with a value of 3 (2, 1) for A (B, C). 
Resolution before t=0 (t=50, t=100) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the team reaches agreement 
before the timer starts (before 50 seconds have passed, before 100 seconds have passed). Time to resolution 
measures the duration of the bargaining process in seconds. Prize won (if non-zero) records the prize the 
contestant takes home (if she did not leave empty-handed). Prize won (if non-zero) / initial jackpot records her 
prize as a fraction of the initial jackpot (if she did not leave empty-handed). All monetary values are in UK 
Pounds and can be translated into US dollars using a rate of $1,60 per pound, an approximate average of the 
exchange rate during the period in which the show ran. 
 
 N Mean Stdev Min Median Max 
All teams       
  Answer Round 1 (correct=1) 280 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Answer Round 2 219 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Answer Round 3 119 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Answer Round 4 37 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Answer Round 5 7 0.29 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Jackpot change Round 1 55 9,010 3,135 2,963 9,360 13,170 
  Jackpot change Round 2 54 14,170 8,112 -5,648 16,125 25,500 
  Jackpot change Round 3 34 9,665 19,762 -25,342 5,293 37,950 
  Jackpot change Round 4 17 5,698 31,528 -51,919 -2,280 53,400 
  Jackpot change Round 5 5 -6,319 28,695 -41,040 -17,887 27,750 
Teams eliminated after three mistakes       
  Quiz rounds 13 2.23 1.09 0.00 2.00 4.00 
Teams playing bargaining stage       
  Quiz rounds 43 3.16 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 
  Mistakes 43 1.70 0.51 0.00 2.00 2.00 
  Jackpot 43 33,512 26,154 7,282 23,288 115,755 
  Prize A / jackpot 43 0.62 0.04 0.59 0.60 0.70 
  Prize B / jackpot 43 0.27 0.04 0.19 0.30 0.30 
  Prize C / jackpot 43 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.12 
  Initial claim (A=3, B=2, C=1) 129 2.74 0.53 1.00 3.00 3.00 
  Final claim (A=3, B=2, C=1) 129 2.14 0.83 1.00 2.00 3.00 
  Resolution before t=0 (resolution=1) 43 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Resolution before t=50 43 0.51 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Resolution before t=100 43 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Time to resolution (in seconds) 43 50.26 35.39 0.00 50.00 100.00 
  Prize won 129 5,633 8,616 0 2,615 56,895 
  Prize won if non-zero 105 6,921 9,075 135 4,030 56,895 
  Prize won / initial jackpot 129 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.66 
  Prize won if non-zero / initial jackpot 105 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.15 0.66 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
The table shows descriptive statistics for our sample of 129 contestants who bargain over their share of the 
jackpot in the final stage of the British TV game show Divided. Age is the contestant’s age measured in years. 
Contestants normally mention their age when they introduce themselves. In eight exceptions, we had to 
estimate a contestant’s age on the basis of her physical appearance and other information given in the 
introductory talk. Gender is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant is male. Education is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant has completed or is enrolled in higher education 
(bachelor degree or higher) or has equivalent working experience. This variable is estimated on the basis of the 
contestant’s occupation and other available information. Contestants who provided no job or other relevant 
information (seven cases) are included in the lower education category. Variance shares denotes the variance 
across the three percentage shares to be divided. The contribution variables measure the contestant’s 
entitlement to the communal jackpot. Contribution overall measures her contribution across all quiz questions. 
Contribution correct (incorrect) measures her contribution to the team’s correctly (incorrectly) answered 
questions only. Announce hardball, Opp. announce hardball and Concession are dummy variables taking the 
value of 1 if the contestant stated not to back down from her initial claim, faced at least one opponent who had 
stated not to back down, or gave in during the bargaining process, respectively. Concession is not defined if the 
team agrees immediately or if the contestant initially picked share C; withdrawn concessions are ignored. All 
monetary values are in UK Pounds and can be translated into US dollars using a rate of $1,60 per pound, an 
approximate average of the exchange rate during the period in which the show ran. 
 
 N Mean Stdev Min Median Max 
  Age 129 36.16 12.23 18.00 34.00 70.00 
  Gender (male=1) 129 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Education (high=1) 129 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Variance shares 129 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.07 
  Contribution overall 129 0.33 0.12 0.07 0.33 0.70 
  Contribution correct 129 0.33 0.09 0.10 0.33 0.56 
  Contribution incorrect 129 0.33 0.20 0.00 0.33 1.00 
  Announce hardball (hardball=1) 129 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Opp. announce hardball (hardball=1) 129 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Concession (concession=1) 115 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table A3: Ordered Probit Regression Results on Initial Claims 
The table displays results from the ordered probit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to initially claim 
share A (3), B (2), or C (1) in the bargaining stage of the British TV game show Divided. First mover is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant was the first to make her claim. The stakes quartile dummies are 
used as a flexible specification for the effect of stakes. Definitions of other variables are as in Table 2. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering at the team level, p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Demographic characteristics     
  Age -0.012 (0.233) -0.013 (0.227) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.187 (0.517) -0.230 (0.428) 
  Education (high=1) 0.005 (0.988) -0.008 (0.980) 
Situational variables     
  First mover (first=1) 0.018 (0.949) 0.007 (0.981) 
  Stakes 2
nd
 quartile 0.279 (0.529) 0.288 (0.510) 
  Stakes 3
rd
 quartile 0.082 (0.820) 0.090 (0.799) 
  Stakes 4
th
 quartile -0.235 (0.515) -0.208 (0.558) 
  Variance shares 12.265 (0.313) 11.742 (0.335) 
Contribution variables     
  Contribution overall 3.007 (0.002)   
  Contribution correct   4.133 (0.004) 
  Contribution incorrect   -0.660 (0.206) 
α1 -0.742 (0.373) -0.680 (0.475) 
α2 0.219 (0.793) 0.288 (0.762) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -74.45 -73.71 
McFadden R
2
 0.075 0.084 
Observations 129 129 
Clusters 43 43 
  
Table A4: Probit Regression Results on Hardball Announcements and Concessions 
The table displays results from the probit regression analyses on contestants’ hardball announcements (Model 1 and 2) and concessions (Model 3, 4, 5 and 6) in the 
bargaining stage of the British TV game show Divided. The hardball (concession) analyses are performed on the subset of contestants who initially claimed share A (who 
initially claimed share A or B and did not reach agreement immediately). Definitions of variables are as in the previous tables. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at 
the team level, p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Hardball announcements  Concessions 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Demographic characteristics              
  Age -0.008 (0.553) -0.007 (0.625)  0.000 (0.998) -0.007 (0.562) -0.003 (0.798) -0.009 (0.433) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.161 (0.576) -0.123 (0.696)  0.080 (0.773) -0.096 (0.715) 0.005 (0.987) -0.184 (0.522) 
  Education (high=1) 0.011 (0.972) 0.033 (0.920)  -0.003 (0.992) -0.057 (0.852) 0.064 (0.847) 0.034 (0.920) 
Situational variables              
  First mover (first=1) -0.106 (0.701) -0.121 (0.664)  0.179 (0.559) 0.300 (0.359) 0.154 (0.623) 0.278 (0.394) 
  Stakes 2
nd
 quartile 0.942 (0.040) 0.934 (0.044)  -0.529 (0.029) -0.532 (0.032) -0.503 (0.056) -0.535 (0.046) 
  Stakes 3
rd
 quartile 0.767 (0.092) 0.746 (0.106)  -0.583 (0.009) -0.545 (0.018) -0.541 (0.013) -0.508 (0.022) 
  Stakes 4
th
 quartile 1.032 (0.015) 1.009 (0.021)  -0.239 (0.302) -0.156 (0.514) -0.175 (0.479) -0.090 (0.720) 
  Variance shares 30.679 (0.033) 31.002 (0.032)  -6.632 (0.524) -9.183 (0.385) -4.396 (0.639) -7.050 (0.461) 
Contribution variables              
  Contribution overall -0.006 (0.996)    -1.273 (0.273)   -1.620 (0.201)   
  Contribution correct   -0.533 (0.772)    0.085 (0.961)   -0.539 (0.764) 
  Contribution incorrect   -0.005 (0.994)    1.801 (0.035)   2.001 (0.027) 
Claim variables              
  Initial claim A (A=1)          0.388 (0.239) 0.524 (0.143) 
  Announce hardball (hardball=1)          -0.985 (0.002) -1.000 (0.003) 
  Opp. announce hardball (hardball=1)          0.491 (0.098) 0.499 (0.099) 
Constant -2.397 (0.023) -2.293 (0.049)  0.992 (0.233) 0.330 (0.726) 0.806 (0.322) 0.044 (0.961) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -53.84 -53.79  -76.59 -74.24 -69.87 -67.48 
McFadden R
2 
0.102 0.103  0.039 0.069 0.123 0.153 
Observations 102 102  115 115 115 115 
Clusters 43 43  39 39 39 39 
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Table A5: Ordered Probit Regression Results on Share Won 
The table displays results from the ordered probit regression analyses on contestants’ final claims A (3), B (2) or 
C (1) when agreement is reached in the bargaining stage of the British TV game show Divided. Definitions of 
variables are as in the previous tables. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the team level, p-values 
are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Demographic characteristics         
  Age -0.011 (0.357) -0.010 (0.386) 0.000 (0.979) 0.002 (0.887) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.011 (0.956) 0.066 (0.748) 0.138 (0.521) 0.245 (0.275) 
  Education (high=1) -0.020 (0.925) -0.003 (0.989) -0.146 (0.590) -0.120 (0.659) 
Situational variables         
  First mover (first=1) -0.132 (0.687) -0.181 (0.590) -0.115 (0.735) -0.160 (0.639) 
Contribution variables         
  Contribution overall 2.871 (0.002)   2.300 (0.030)   
  Contribution correct   2.969 (0.037)   2.216 (0.167) 
  Contribution incorrect   -1.260 (0.049)   -1.243 (0.043) 
Claim variables         
  Initial claim A (A=1)     6.302 (0.000) 5.927 (0.000) 
  Initial claim B (B=1)     5.780 (0.000) 5.511 (0.000) 
  Announce hardball (hardball=1)     0.889 (0.011) 0.869 (0.017) 
  Opp. announce hardball (hardball=1)     -0.522 (0.018) -0.547 (0.014) 
α1 0.059 (0.900) -0.285 (0.644) 6.299 (0.000) 5.558 (0.000) 
α2 0.979 (0.040) 0.642 (0.299) 7.404 (0.000) 6.676 (0.000) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -110.10 -109.52 -94.37 -93.70 
McFadden R
2
 0.046 0.051 0.182 0.188 
Observations 105 105 105 105 
Clusters 35 35 35 35 
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Table A6: OLS Regression Results on Prize Won / Initial Jackpot 
The table displays results from the OLS regression analyses on the fraction of the initial jackpot that the 
contestant takes home in the British TV game show Divided. Definitions of variables are as in the previous 
tables. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the team level, p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Demographic characteristics         
  Age -0.003 (0.022) -0.003 (0.032) -0.002 (0.030) -0.002 (0.041) 
  Gender (male=1) -0.019 (0.484) -0.017 (0.551) -0.014 (0.614) -0.012 (0.682) 
  Education (high=1) -0.017 (0.620) -0.017 (0.641) -0.025 (0.496) -0.025 (0.495) 
Situational variables         
  First mover (first=1) -0.004 (0.899) -0.009 (0.809) 0.002 (0.951) -0.001 (0.963) 
  Stakes 2
nd
 quartile -0.089 (0.056) -0.089 (0.057) -0.083 (0.124) -0.082 (0.127) 
  Stakes 3
rd
 quartile -0.082 (0.063) -0.083 (0.061) -0.079 (0.126) -0.079 (0.123) 
  Stakes 4
th
 quartile 0.020 (0.655) 0.019 (0.671) 0.033 (0.531) 0.032 (0.543) 
  Variance shares -4.037 (0.009) -4.002 (0.011) -3.769 (0.032) -3.726 (0.036) 
Contribution variables         
  Contribution overall 0.388 (0.000)   0.374 (0.001)   
  Contribution correct   0.437 (0.007)   0.436 (0.003) 
  Contribution incorrect   -0.114 (0.092)   -0.115 (0.086) 
Claim variables         
  Initial claim A (A=1)     0.071 (0.059) 0.079 (0.049) 
  Initial claim B (B=1)     0.072 (0.091) 0.089 (0.068) 
  Announce hardball (hardball=1)     0.053 (0.175) 0.054 (0.170) 
  Opp. announce hardball (hardball=1)     -0.068 (0.050) -0.070 (0.050) 
Constant 0.380 (0.000) 0.397 (0.000) 0.298 (0.003) 0.303 (0.003) 
R
2
 0.185 0.186 0.238 0.241 
Observations 129 129 129 129 
Clusters 43 43 43 43 
 
 
